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1. Introduction
I ought to rake the leaves because I promised to do so. Voter suppression is bad
because of how it undermines democracy. These are normative explanations, where
the  rightness  or  goodness  of  something  is  explained.  Such  explanations  are
ubiquitous in ordinary normative thought, and what first-order normative theories
aim  to  provide.  But  whereas  there  is  a  great  deal  of  research  on  scientific
explanation,  there  is  little  on  normative  explanation.  A  central  question  about
normative explanation is how it  is similar to and different from explanations  in
various  non-normative  domains.  Many approaches  to  metaethics  (non-naturalist
realism, expressivism, and certain forms of constitutivism and constructivism, to
name a few) suggest that normative explanation differs significantly from scientific
explanation.  It  is  also  unclear  just  how  normative  explanation  might  relate  to
metaphysical  explanation  of  the  sort  that  many  contemporary  metaphysicians
associate  with  the  notion  of  grounding.  Is  the  former  a  form of  the  latter,  or
something else altogether? These questions won’t be defused by treating normative
explanation as internal to first-order normative theory in the way that quietists and
quasi-realist expressivists tend to do. The question of whether and how it is similar
enough  to  explanations  in  other  domains  to  warrant  the  common  label
‘explanation’ would still arise.
Given this  comparatively  undeveloped state  of theorizing about  normative
explanation, the prospect of a general theory of explanation should be enticing. A
general theory would provide us with at least some grip on normative explanation
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which is independent of the explanations that various normative theories provide,
and some help in sorting out how normative explanation may be similar to and
different from explanations in other domains. This paper explores, as a case study,
a theory which holds just such promise: Bradford Skow’s recent theory of answers
to why-questions, according to which a complete answer to the question why Q
consists of all of the reasons why Q (Skow 2016). I’ll argue that this theory cannot
adequately  account  for the role of a certain “enablers” of reasons in  normative
explanation. This result is of broader interest than just that one allegedly general
theory fails to be fully general.  As I’ll explain in the next section, theories of this
general sort may be important to normative theory in several respects. They don’t
merely promise to  provide a general framework for normative explanation which
unifies it with explanations in other domains. They also promise to inform inquiry
into the nature of normative explanation and improve our understanding of what
first-order normative theories might be doing when specifying why the good and
the right things are good and right. They may also be important to our broader
understanding of normative reasons. As such, theories of answers to why-questions
merit further exploration by normative theorists.
2. Why-Questions and Reasons Why
The term ‘explanation’ is used in many ways. Skow argues that most theories that
have been branded by their proponents as “theories of explanation” shouldn’t be
branded that way. A “theory of explanation” that typically interests those who are
interested  in  scientific  or  causal  explanation  is  best  thought  of  as  a  theory  of
answers  to  why-  questions  (Skow  2016:  ch.  1).  For  instance,  when  scientists
consider questions like ‘Why did the dinosaurs go extinct?’ they aim to find an
answer to a why-question. (By contrast, a theory of explanation, properly so-called,
is a theory of a kind of speech act. Explaining is something people do with words.
See Skow 2016: 9.) The content of a correct answer is often aptly described as a
reason why: a reason why the dinosaurs became extinct is that a comet or asteroid
hit the Earth. A request for what we often call “an explanation” of why something
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happened is then a request for a reason why it happened. When R is a reason why
Q, some relation exists between Q and R such that Q occurs  because  R occurs.
Such relations are often called explanatory, but that terminology is inessential here.
Below when I speak of ‘explanations’,  I’ll do so for stylistic reasons and mean
‘contents of answers to why-questions’. 
Skow’s overall theory consists of two main claims. The first is a theory of
answers to why-questions. Skow writes: “A canonical statement of the complete
answer to the question why E happened will  have the form ‘one reason why E
happened is that A, another reason why E happened is that B, another reason why E
happened is that  C, …, and these are all the reasons why E happened’.” (Skow
2016: 42; cf. 51). In short: 
(CA) A complete answer to the question why Q lists all  of the reasons
why Q, and nothing else.
The  individual  reasons  why  then  are  atomic  parts  of  a  complete  answer.  The
second main claim is a theory of reasons why. Its close-to-official statement runs as
follows:
(RW) Necessarily, if it is a fact that Q and it is a fact that R, then:  if the
fact that R is a cause of the fact that Q, then one reason why Q is
that R, and the reason why <one reason why Q is that R> is that the
fact that R is a cause of the fact that Q. Similarly if the fact that R is
a ground of the fact that Q. And every reason why Q is (i) either a
cause  of  the  fact  that  Q or  a  ground of  the  fact  that  Q and  (ii)
satisfies the relevant one of these conditionals. (Skow 2016: 38)1
1 I’ll use corner brackets to keep iterations of reasons why readable. By ‘fact’ Skow means ‘the 
occurrence of a concrete event’ where events are understood liberally but exclude certain 
mathematical facts, such as that 2 + 2 = 4 (Skow 2016: 27-8). No direct argument is given for 
the claim that it is because causes and grounds are causes and grounds that they are reasons 
why. 
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In a slogan: all reasons why that are facts are either causes or grounds.2 That the tire
blew out is a cause of the car skidding off the road. That the average kinetic energy
of the molecules that constitute the air in this room increased is a ground for the
increase  of  temperature  in  this  room.  Each  is  a  reason  why something  occurs.
(Skow 2016: 28- 9.) Skow refines (RW) later on, but holds to (CA) throughout.
Skow doesn’t  consider reasons why normative facts  hold.  But (CA) and
(RW) don’t exclude normative facts. Theories of this sort should interest normative
theorists. When they talk about why things have their normative properties, they
speak not only of actions being permissible in virtue of causing no harm, of policies
being good  because  they reduce inequality, and of actions being  made wrong  by
lack of consent. They also speak of not causing harm, reduction of inequality, and
lack  of  consent  as  reasons why  things  are  permissible,  good,  and wrong.  So a
theory like Skow’s holds the prospect of showing how normative explanation is
continuous with explanation in other domains: each aims to answer certain why-
questions  by  offering  certain  kinds  of  reasons  why.  Indeed,  the  theory  can  be
thought  to  apply  to  much of  the recent  literature  on moral  explanations.  Many
philosophers  hold that  moral  explanations  cite  a  kind of  grounds (Bader  2017;
Leary 2017; Sachs 2018), and Wielenberg (2014) holds that they cite a kind of
causes.3
The theory can also be applied to first-order normative theories, which aim
to specify not only which things have which normative features but also why they
do so. For instance, utilitarians should be happy to state their theory by saying that
the only ultimate reason why right actions are right is that they maximize utility.
Theories of prima facie duties say there is an irreducible plurality of reasons why
acts are prima facie duties (Ross 1930). First-order normative theories may thus be
thought to be explanatory in the sense that they aim to specify reasons why things
have the normative  features  they do. The notion of a  reason why also supplies
2 Skow argues that ‘reason why’ and ‘because’ are “ambiguous between meanings used to report 
someone’s reasons for acting and meanings used when one makes no claim to be reporting 
someone’s reason for acting” (Skow 2016: 175ff.; cf. Anscombe 1963: §5). As I won’t consider
action explanation, the issue won’t affect my discussion.
3 Expressivists are welcome to treat normative reasons why in a quasi-realist way.
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multiple ways of understanding the structure of a moral theory. Kantians might not
want to say, for fear of rule-fetishism, that the reason why an action is wrong is that
its maxim couldn’t be willed as a universal law. But they might instead say that the
fact that one’s maxim of lying to get out of trouble couldn’t be willed as a universal
law is a higher-level reason why. For it might be a reason why <the fact that S lied
to get out of trouble is a reason why what S did was wrong>.4 It would still be a
normative reason why, in the sense of a fact that is a reason why a normative fact
holds.  Skow’s theory promises  to  unify these normative explanations  with how
correct answers to why-questions work in general.
Finally,  many  people  think  there  are  important  connections  between
normative reasons for action and reasons why we ought to do things. For instance,
many hold that a normative reason for S to φ is a reason why (or else something
that  makes  it  the  case that)  S ought  to  φ (Alvarez  2010;  Broome 2013;  Nebel
forthcoming). Insofar as such views are credible, understanding why-questions and
reasons why in normative contexts may be important to our broader understanding
of normative reasons.
A final preliminary worth noting is that (RW) is restricted to cases where
both ‘Q’ and ‘R’ in ‘R is a reason why Q’ hold the place for a that-clause that
expresses a fact (Skow 2016: 35). This assumption may fail in normative contexts.
Some believe that there can be reasons why one ought to do something even if it
isn’t the case that one ought to do it (Nebel forthcoming). If so, ‘R is a reason why
Q’ isn’t factive with respect to ‘Q’. For all that such examples show, however, it is
factive with respect to ‘R’; and it seems less plausible that a false proposition can
be a reason why one ought to do something. The problems I’ll press wouldn’t be
solved by allowing that ‘R is a reason why Q’ is non-factive with respect to ‘Q’, so
I’ll bracket the question whether allowing this would raise distinct challenges. All
that I’ll need for my purposes is that ‘R is a reason why Q’ be factive with respect
to ‘R’.
4 As we’ll see in section 4, Skow distinguishes between levels of reasons why. The distinction 
makes room for these different options. 
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3. Enablers of Reasons Why
The  conjunction  of  (CA)  and  (RW)  runs  into  trouble  with  a  certain  kind  of
“enablers”  of  reasons  which  are  of  interest  to  normative  theory.  I’ll  argue  as
follows:
(P1) A fully  adequate  general  framework for normative  explanation  is
such that, for any enabler E, it accounts for the role that E would
play in normative explanation.
(P2) [(CA) and (RW)] fails to account for the role that certain enablers
would play in normative explanation.
(C) So,  [(CA)  and  (RW)]  doesn’t  provide  a  fully  adequate  general
framework for normative explanation.
I’ll first explain what enablers are, and then defend my premises. My discussion
will  show  that  certain  refinements  of  (RW)  also  fail  to  accommodate  certain
enablers.
In normative theory, “reasons holism” holds that a fact that in one set of
circumstances is a reason why a normative fact holds may not be such a reason in
another set of circumstances (Dancy 2004: 7, 86, 90). A parallel “value holism”
holds that a feature may make its bearer good in one case without making its bearer
good in another case. Here are illustrations (adapted from Dancy) of each view:
Pleasure: The fact that an experience gives me pleasure is often a reason why
the  experience  good,  but  may be  no  such reason at  all  if  the  pleasure  is
vicious.
Promises: The fact that I promised to rake the leaves is often a reason why I
ought to rake the leaves, but may be no such reason at all if the promise was
extracted by duress or fraud, or was a promise to do something immoral.
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Holists also say that the fact that a pleasure isn’t vicious “enables” the fact that the
experience is pleasurable to be a reason why the experience is good, without itself
being a reason why it  is good (Dancy 2004: ch. 3). Similarly,  the fact that my
promise wasn’t extracted by duress or fraud enables the fact that I promised to rake
the leaves to be a reason why I ought to rake the leaves, but without itself being a
reason why I ought to rake the leaves.
Why accept (P1)? The holism of reasons and value is controversial.  One
might take issue with examples like Pleasure and Promises. And some argue that
enablers are parts of complete reasons, not distinct from reasons (Raz 1999). Under
non-holist  theories,  correct  explanations  of  particular  normative  facts  might  not
rely on enablers. Act-utilitarianism is an example, provided that the fact that an act
promotes  pleasure  is  a  reason  why  the  act  is  right  even  when  the  pleasure  is
vicious. However, (P1) doesn’t require that the normative explanations offered by
any plausible normative theory must  account for the role of enablers. (P1) only
requires that a general framework for normative explanation account for the role of
enablers  should there be any. Such frameworks shouldn’t  prejudge the issue of
holism. (P1) is also dialectically sound. Skow’s theory is general and, as we’ll see,
he discusses enablers. 
I’ll  now  argue  that  his  treatment  of  enablers  doesn’t  succeed,  as  (P2)
claims.  The  discussion  will  be  instructive  for  any  account  of  enablers  in
explanation. The enabler that I’ll focus on can be introduced by considering the
principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (OIC). (I’ll treat OIC as a necessary truth about
the practical ‘ought’; its necessity needn’t be analytic or conceptual.)  To say that
‘ought’ implies ‘can’ is to say that an agent ought to φ (at a given time) only if the
agent (at that time) has both the ability and the opportunity to φ.
What role does the fact that S can φ play with respect to answers to the
question why S ought to φ? The simplest option would be to say that it is part of a
complete  answer  to  the  question  why  S  ought  to  φ.  This  won’t  do,  though.
Remember (CA): a complete answer to the question why Q lists all of the reasons
why Q, and nothing else. Given this, the simplest option entails that the fact that S
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can φ is a reason why S ought to φ. But, certain exceptions aside, when S ought to
φ, the fact that S can φ doesn’t contribute to making that the case.5 The reasons
why I ought to help others, for instance, are facts such as that they need help, or
that  helping  others  will  maximize  happiness,  or  that  helping  others  is  in  their
interests, or the like. That I can help others doesn’t seem to be among them. Or
consider the various heinous acts I could perform. It is false that there is at least
this much to be said in favor of such an act being what I ought to do: that I can do
it.
More  plausibly,  normally  the  fact  that  I  can  help  others  constitutes  the
absence of a condition (the impossibility of helping others) whose presence would
block these other facts from being reasons why I ought to help.6 If the fact that S
can φ is an enabler  of other facts as reasons why S ought to φ, then (CA) won’t
count that fact as part of a complete answer to the question why S ought to φ.
Dancy argues convincingly that P can enable R to be a reason why Q without P
itself being a reason why Q (Dancy 2004: ch. 3). Skow presumably agrees, given
his view that if P is a reason why <R is a reason why Q>, it doesn’t follow that P is
a reason why Q (Skow 2016: 76). It also seems intuitively correct that an enabler of
R as a reason why Q isn’t thereby itself a reason why Q. Consider a match that lit
when struck, but wouldn’t have lit if the match had been wet. The dryness of the
match  doesn’t  contribute  to  causing  the  match  to  light,  but  merely  enables  its
striking to be a cause of its lighting. As a mere enabling condition it isn’t part of a
complete answer to the question why the match lit. 
5 If I have been paralyzed for a while, the fact that I can flex my arm might be a reason why I 
should do so, not merely an enabler of some other reason (Dancy 2004: 40).
6 This result isn’t immediate if something can be a reason why I ought to φ even if it isn’t the 
case that I ought to φ (Nebel forthcoming). For if so, there might be cases where I cannot φ and 
yet some fact R is a reason why I ought to φ. However, cases where something is a reason why 
one ought to φ even if it isn’t the case that one ought to φ seem to arise from factors other than 
the absence of the ability or the opportunity to φ. (These don’t feature among the examples in 
Nebel forthcoming.) For it is plausible that ‘is a reason why one ought’ implies ‘is a reason to’ 
(see e.g. Broome 2013). It also seems plausible that ‘is a reason to’ entails ‘can’: nothing can be
a normative reason (at least one contributing to one ought to do) for an agent to do something 
she cannot do (see e.g. Streumer 2007 and Vranas 2007). If so, then ‘is a reason why one ought’
entails ‘can’.
8
What we have so far is that, in cases where S ought to φ, the fact that S can
φ isn’t normally a reason why S ought to φ, but enables other facts to be reasons
why S ought to φ. There is more to say about this enabler in particular. That S can
φ is a  general  enabler of  any reason why S ought to do some particular thing, in
contrast to more specific enablers, such as those in Pleasure and Promises. If the
fact that I can φ were a reason why I ought to φ, then every act I ought to do would
have one reason why in common, namely that I can do the thing in question. But it
doesn’t seem that if we know that I ought to φ, we thereby already know one of the
reasons why I ought to φ, namely that I can φ (Dancy 2004: 40). 
So  far  so  good.  But  the  following  question  remains  for  any  theory  of
explanation: what role might an enabler of a reason why Q play with respect to Q?
(Or what roles? General and specific enablers might play different sorts of roles.)
To say that a complete answer to the question why Q lists all of the reasons why Q
plus all  enablers of those reasons, where those enablers may not themselves be
reasons why Q, would retain (RW) but only at the cost of giving up (CA). I’ll
discuss three other responses on behalf of [(CA) and (RW)] instead:
 Response 1: That S can φ isn’t a reason why S ought to φ but is a reason
why some other fact R is a reason why S ought to φ. As a reason why that it
part of a complete answer to a different why-question, it satisfies both (CA)
and (RW). 
 Response 2: That S can φ is a merely partial answer to the question why S
ought to φ or the question why the fact that R is a reason why S ought to φ,
but not part of a complete answer to either, and thus not a counterexample
to (CA) or (RW). 
 Response  3:  That  S can  φ is  no  answer  at  all  (neither  a  merely  partial
answer nor part of a complete answer) to the question why S ought to φ or
the question why the fact that R is a reason why S ought to φ, and thus
again not a counterexample to (CA) or (RW).
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4. Trying Out Response 1
Response 1 gets legs from one of Skow’s chief refinements to (RW): the distinction
between levels of reasons why (Skow 2016: ch. 5). For any reason R why Q, we
can ask why <R is a reason why Q>. Often there will be an answer: some fact that
is a reason why <R is a reason why Q>. This delivers  higher-level  reasons why:
reasons why <R is a reason why Q>. One of Skow’s uses of the distinction between
first-level and higher- level reasons why is to identify the role of laws with respect
to reasons why effects of causes occur. When C is a cause of E, a law L connecting
C and E is a higher-level reason why <the occurrence of C is  a reason why E
happened>. (CA) then counts it as part of a complete answer to the corresponding
higher-level why-question. But as many have noted, it doesn’t follow that L is a
first-level reason why E happened.7 As Skow puts is, “the proposition that A is a
reason why <B is a reason why C> does not entail the proposition that A is a reason
why C” (Skow 2016: 76). Skow’s official full refinement of (RW) to accommodate
higher-level reasons why (and other complications) is very complex (Skow 2016:
124). But I won’t need to state the full theory to discuss whether the distinction
between levels of reasons why helps to account for enablers. The idea is that even
if the fact that S can φ isn’t part of a complete answer to the question why S ought
to φ, it might be part of a complete answer to the related question why some other
fact R is a reason why S ought to φ, and thus a higher-level reason why. This would
save the conjunction of (CA) and (RW). 
Skow recognizes that there are enablers. He claims that in its “ordinary”
sense,  ‘enabler’  is  different  from the concept  of  a  reason why:  “Suppose  I  am
chosen by lottery to be ‘team runner’; the condition of my legs enables me to play
that role, but it does not seem to be a reason why I play that role” (Skow 2016:
85n19). I’ll bracket the question of what role if any enablers in this sense play with
respect to why-questions. (Skow doesn’t specify.) For Skow distinguishes a “semi-
technical” sense of ‘enabler’: “If X is an enabler of R with respect to the fact that
Q, it enables R to be a sufficient reason why Q when it otherwise would not be”
7 Väyrynen (2009: 101-2) makes this point about laws and causes in the context of arguing that we 
shouldn’t assume that what makes R a reason for something must itself be a reason for it. 
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(Skow 2016: 109).8 An enabler in this sense would seem to be part of a complete
answer to the question why <R is a reason why Q>. (CA) then requires it to be a
(higher-level)  reason why.9 Skow claims that  the fact  that  oxygen was present,
which enables the striking of a match with respect to the match lighting, is a reason
why <the fact that the match was struck is a reason why it lit> (Skow 2016: 78,
109).  However,  he  doesn’t  defend  this  claim  or  offer  a  theory  of  higher-level
reasons why to support it (cf. Skow 2016: 179).10 
In some cases where S ought to φ, the fact that S can φ enables, in this
semi-technical sense, some other fact to be a reason why S ought to φ. But that will
hold only in some cases: not all reasons why S ought to φ are sufficient, whereas
Skow’s  semi-technical  notion  is  restricted  to  enablers  of  sufficient  reasons.
However, I see no deep reason to deny that contributory reasons why Q, which
may not be sufficient for Q to occur, can also have enablers in this semi-technical
sense. For instance, if reasons holism is true, the fact that the pleasure isn’t vicious
might  enable the fact  that  an experience  is  pleasurable to  be a reason why the
experience is good. Thus extended, the semi-technical notion of an enabler is at
least  close (and closer  than Skow’s “ordinary” sense) to the notion of enablers
deployed by reasons and value holism. Skow might thus well be sympathetic to
Response 1. An enabler of R with respect to Q is a higher-level reason why <R is a
reason why Q>, and thus qualifies under [(CA) and (RW)] as part of a complete
answer to the question why <R is a reason why Q>.
It is unclear whether Response 1 is adequate. Suppose (to turn Skow’s team
runner example into a normative case) that the fact that I was chosen by lottery to
8 This is a generalization of the notion of a causal enabler introduced by Yablo (2010: 98). It is 
probably not quite right as it stands, since enablers may themselves be subject to disablers or 
require enablers, and so on.
9 (RW) requires that if an enabler of R with respect to Q is a reason why <R is a reason why Q>, 
it is a cause or a ground of <R is a reason why Q>. Skow grants that this has counterexamples: 
not every reason why is either a cause or a ground (Skow 2016: 108-9). Some reasons why are 
enablers or “ennoblers” (a notion from Yablo 2010 that I don’t need to discuss here). He 
considers an alternative to (RW) according to which all reasons why are either causes, grounds, 
or enablers or ennoblers. He says this hypothesis “has a nice ring to it” but doesn’t endorse it 
(Skow 2016: 109). Enablers that don’t count as higher-level reasons why are equally a problem 
for this hypothesis.
10 Below we’ll see reasons for concern about treating enablers, qua enablers, as higher-level 
reasons why.
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be team runner is a reason why I ought to be team runner. Then the fact that I can
play the role of team runner (thanks to the condition of my legs) enables the fact
that I was chosen to play that role to be a reason why I ought to play it. Response 1
requires that the fact that I can be team runner is a reason why <that I was chosen
by lottery to be team runner is a reason why I ought to serve as team runner>. For
now, at least, this claim remains a mere assertion. It doesn’t appear to be certified
by clear and confident intuitive judgments about reasons why. And again, Skow
doesn’t help intuition by offering a theory of higher-level reasons why to support
the claim. 
It is in any case unclear what illumination would be gained by affirming
that, for any fact R that is a reason why S ought to φ, the fact that S can φ is a
higher-level reason why <R is a reason why S ought to φ>. A fact such as that
promising  to  φ  creates  a  legitimate  expectation  that  one  φ  is  at  least  a  clear
candidate for a reason why <that I promised to rake the leaves is a reason why I
ought to rake the leaves>. And a general principle to the effect that we ought to
help those in need is at least a clear candidate for a reason why <that she needs my
help is a reason why I ought to help her>.11 If they play any role with respect to the
relevant reasons why, it will be a distinctive role in making it the case that certain
other facts are reasons. (Grounds are often glossed as facts that make it the case
that the fact they ground obtains.) By contrast, the role of an enabler is that of a
necessary background condition for some other fact(s) to do such work. It requires
further argument to say that enabling is a similarly distinctive sort of case-making
role. Perhaps we could say that if I cannot φ, this makes it the case (for any R) that
R isn’t a reason why I ought to φ. But if not-P makes it the case that not-Q, it
doesn’t follow that P makes it the case that Q.
This problem for Response 1 isn’t decisive. There might be ways to refine
(RW) to deal with it, even as it isn’t clear what such refinements might be. But
Response 1 also has implausible implications. (RW) implies that if an enabler of R
11 Treating normative laws or principles as higher-level reasons why fits with those views of 
normative explanation where principles aren’t part of singular explanations of normative facts 
but only “back” them.
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with respect to Q is a higher-level reason why, then the enabler is a cause or a
ground of <R is a reason why Q>. However, being a cause of something and being
a  ground  of  something  are  asymmetric  relations,  whereas  being  an  enabling
condition  for  something isn’t  an asymmetric  relation.  As Shlomit  Cohen notes,
“just as the fact that Bale is a good forward player is an enabling condition for the
fact  that  Ronaldo is  a good forward player,  so the fact  that  Ronaldo is  a good
forward player is an enabling condition for the fact that Bale is a good forward
player” (Cohen forthcoming: 5). (This problem extends beyond general enablers,
so the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ may not be crucial to my objection, but
only a particularly clear case of it.) So, if enablers are higher-level reasons why,
(RW) has incorrect implications for enablers.
A further  problem with  Response  1  again  highlights  special  features  of
general enablers. If the fact that S can φ were a reason why some other fact R is a
reason why S ought to φ, then every instance of <R is a reason why S ought to φ>
would have one higher-level reason why in common, namely that S can φ.  But
recall Dancy’s point (introduced in section 3) against treating a general enabler for
<R is a reason why Q> as itself a reason why Q. This point can be extended to
higher-level reasons why. When we know that S ought to φ, we know that S can φ
but may not yet know any reason why S ought to φ. We’ll only know that there is a
reason why S ought to φ. So we couldn’t yet even raise any question of the form
‘Why is R a reason why S ought to φ?’ Why then think that we thereby already
know at least one higher-level reason why those facts (whichever they are) that are
reasons why S ought to φ are such reasons? A more tempered conclusion would be
that this kind of a general enabler isn’t a higher-level reason why. 
I conclude that we have no good reason to think that enablers will, at least
in general, be reasons why, higher-level or otherwise. If so, Response 1 fails. But
intuitively  the  fact  that  S  can  φ  plays  some part  in  a  complete  answer  to  the
question ‘Why is R a reason why S ought to φ?’ If at least some enablers that aren’t
reasons why still are part of a complete answer to some relevant why-question like
this, then (CA) will be false.
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5. Trying out Responses 2 and 3
Responses 2 and 3 deny the assumption that  the fact  that  S can φ is  part  of a
complete answer to the question why some other fact R is a reason why S ought to
φ. Response 2 gets legs from another distinction Skow draws, between  part of a
complete answer to a why-question and a merely partial answer to a why-question
(Skow 2016: 51). Suppose I ask ‘Who came to the party?’ and you reply ‘Two
people whose names begin with ‘J’’. This isn’t part of a complete answer to my
question. The complete answer “says, of all the people who came to the party, that
they came to the party” (Skow 2016: 41). It is, rather, a merely partial answer –
“something that rules out a possible complete answer” (Skow 2016: 41). In our
example, ‘Two people whose names begin with ‘J’’ is a partial answer because it
entails (among various other things) that ‘Slim and Tim and no one else came to
the party’ isn’t a complete answer. In the case of why-questions, a merely partial
answer rules out a possible complete answer but without putting forward a reason
why (Skow 2016: 46, 51). Response 2 says that in cases where S ought to φ, that S
can φ merely rules out a possible complete  answer both to the question why S
ought  to  φ and the  question  why R is  a  reason why S  ought  to  φ,  instead  of
constituting part of a complete answer to one or the other question.
This is incorrect,  however.  Take first  the question why S ought to φ. If
‘ought’ implies ‘can’, then the fact that S can φ rules out no complete answer to
that question. In ruling out things that S cannot do, it only rules out actions for
which it isn’t the case that S ought to perform them to begin with. So that fact had
better be compatible with all the potential reasons why S ought to φ. Now take the
question why some other fact R is a reason why S ought to φ. The fact that S can φ
rules out no complete answer to that question either. Any complete answer to the
question why R is a reason why S ought to φ must also be compatible with the fact
that S can φ. So ‘S can φ’ isn’t a merely partial answer to either question. Thus
Response 2 fails.
This is where Response 3 kicks in. Suppose that the fact that S can φ isn’t a
merely partial answer to either of these two why-questions. In section 3, I agreed
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that the fact that S can φ isn’t part of a complete answer to the question why S
ought to φ. So the remaining question for me to address is this: why think that the
fact that S can φ is part of a complete answer to the question why R is a reason why
S ought to φ, rather than no answer at all? If ‘S can φ’ were no answer at all,
Response 3 would stand.
Specifying answerhood is a complex and difficult issue in the semantics of
questions and answers, and why-questions have been relatively neglected compared
to alternative questions, yes-no-questions, and (other) wh-questions.12 Skow says
little about what logical properties he takes a complete answer to the question why
Q to have, beyond that it is a conjunction of all of the reasons why Q. This makes it
hard  to  reach  completely  confident  conclusions  about  Response  3.  On the  one
hand, we might suspect that ‘Why is R a reason why S ought to φ?’ presupposes
that S can φ. A presupposition of a question won’t be part of a complete answer to
it.  On the other hand, even if that is so in this  particular  case,  Response 3 sits
poorly  with  enablers  in  general.  Suppose  that  the  value  holist  interpretation  of
Pleasure is right. The question ‘Why is the fact that E is an experience of pleasure
a  reason why E is  good?’  doesn’t  appear  to  presuppose  that  E  isn’t  a  vicious
pleasure. In that case it seems plausible to count the enabler as part of a complete
answer to the question at issue. So I doubt that Response 3 is adequate in general. 
The point just made is consistent with my objection to Response 1. There I
argued that certain enablers aren’t higher-level reasons why, not that they aren’t
parts of complete answers. Reasons why <that E is an experience of pleasure is a
reason why E is good> would seem to be facts about things like how pleasure feels
and what it does to us. We don’t need to count the fact that E isn’t vicious as a
further higher-level reason why to account for its relevance to E’s being good. This
only requires  counting  it  as an enabler.  Even if  Skow’s  account  of a  complete
answer  to  a  why-question  can  be  developed  further  to  deal  with  this  kind  of
observation, the observation at the very least challenges his claim that his accounts
of a complete answer and part of a complete answer to a why-question in terms of
the notion of a reason why “should not be controversial; they should be common
12 See e.g. the surveys in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1997) and Cross and Roelofsen (2018).
15
ground” (Skow 2016: 25). At least for now, I take us to have reason to think that an
enabler of the fact that R as a reason why a normative fact N obtains can be part of
a complete answer to the question ‘Why is R a reason why N obtains?’ without
being a higher-level reason why <R is a reason why N obtains>. If that is the case,
then the conjunction of (CA) and (RW) is false.
6. Taking Stock
A recent theory of answers to why-questions, Skow’s theory of reasons why, says
that a complete answer to the question why some fact holds consists in all of the
reasons why it holds (CA) and that all reasons why that are facts are either causes
or grounds (RW). I have explored this theory’s capacity to illuminate normative
explanation.  I  proposed  that  an  adequate  theoretical  framework  for  normative
explanation should account for the role of enablers in normative explanation. My
main example was the following general enabler: when S ought to φ, the fact that S
can φ is an enabler for any other fact R as a reason why S ought to φ. I first argued
that such enablers aren’t among the first-level reasons why S ought to φ. I then
explored  three  other  responses  on  behalf  of  Skow’s  theory.  I  first  argued  that
counting the enabler that S can φ as a higher-level reason why <R is a reason why
S ought to φ> would be problematic for several reasons. I then argued that the fact
that S can φ isn’t a merely partial answer either to the question why S ought to φ or
the question why some other fact R is a reason why S ought to φ. And finally I
offered reasons to doubt that the fact that S can φ is no answer at all to the question
why R is a reason why S ought to φ.
If all this is right, then some enablers will be parts of complete answers to
certain why-questions without being reasons why. But then (CA) is false, despite
its promise to illuminate normative explanation in conjunction with (RW). A main
choice point for future work is whether an enabler for R as a reason why Q that
isn’t a reason why <R is a reason why Q> really is part of a complete answer to the
question why R is a reason why Q. Those who deny that it is such a part owe us an
account of what role it does play with respect to complete answers to that question,
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if it is neither a merely partial answer nor no answer at all. Those who affirm that it
is such a part need to say more about what kind of part it is. Any account either
way  would  illuminate  normative  explanation  by  specifying  different  ways  that
enablers can relate to explanations of normative facts.
I’ll close by briefly sketching two options. One is to reject (CA) and instead
allow  that  complete  answers  may  include  enablers  as  parts  even  when  those
enablers aren’t themselves reasons why. One merit of this view is that it can say the
following. If our question is why R is a reason why Q, the answer that S can φ is
true – because it is part of a complete answer – but often misleading. That answer
would often carry a pragmatic implication to the effect that the fact that S can φ
makes a distinctive contribution to making it the case that R is a reason why S
ought to φ. Insofar as such contribution is the job of reasons why <R is a reason
why S ought to φ> but the fact that S can φ isn’t such a reason, giving it as an
answer would often be misleading, though not false. That S can φ isn’t what is “at
issue” in  most  conversations  regarding why those facts  that  are  reasons why S
ought to φ are such reasons. That S can φ is a general enabler for every reason why
S ought to φ. Not all contexts are like that, however. If we know that Sue promised
to rake the leaves but you ask why that means Sue ought to do so, sometimes an
appropriate answer may be something like ‘She is able to do it. Nothing prevents
her  from  keeping  her  promise.’  This  option  fits  with  the  common  view  that
answerhood is sensitive to pragmatic considerations.
A different option is to say that a complete answer to the question why Q
consists in all of the reasons why Q, but say that it is a complete answer only when
the relevant enabling conditions hold. This background condition view retains the
narrow letter  of (CA), if  not its  spirit.  But (CA) as it  stands lacks resources to
underwrite this option. One possible way to develop it is to treat the presence of an
enabler  as  a  presupposition  of  the  relevant  why-question.  Some  think  that  a
question presupposes P just in case the truth of P is a logically necessary condition
for there being a correct answer to the question (Belnap and Steel 1976: 5). That S
can φ appears to meet this condition with respect to ‘Why is R a reason why S
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ought to φ?’ It also meets the diagnostic that if the presupposition of a question
isn’t true, the question has no direct unambiguous answer. Where S cannot φ, our
answer won’t be ‘R is a reason why S ought to φ because …’ but something like
‘Hey,  wait  a  minute,  it  isn’t  the  case  that  S  ought  to  φ!’  Such  behavior  is
characteristic  of  presuppositions.  Supplementing  (CA)  with  a  theory  of  the
presuppositions of why-questions might thus help it solve the problem of enablers.
It  isn’t  clear,  however,  that  this  would  work  in  general. In  discussing
Response  3,  I  noted  that  even  if  ‘Why  is  R  a  reason  why  S  ought  to  φ?’
presupposes that S can φ, ‘Why is the fact that E is an experience of pleasure a
reason why E is good?’ doesn’t presuppose the holding of the enabling condition
that the pleasure isn’t vicious. Moreover, if we concede to Skow that some enablers
are higher-level reasons why, how do we distinguish those enablers in a principled
way from enablers that are presuppositions rather than parts of complete answers to
(higher-level)  why-questions? A more  sophisticated  theory  of  answers  to  why-
questions might be able to resolve such complications in favor of (CA). But the
jury is clearly still out on that issue.
I’ll  close by iterating why the issues raised in this  paper should interest
normative theorists. Thinking about normative explanation in terms of reasons why
promises to unify normative explanation with explanation in other domains. It fits
well with the kinds of answers that normative theories aim to provide to questions
like why we ought to do what we ought to do, why the good things are good, and
so on. It may also be important to our broader understanding of normative reasons.
Moreover,  distinguishing between levels of reasons why helps us to distinguish
distinct  projects  in  normative  theory,  such  as  explaining  why  we  ought  to  do
certain things and explaining why certain facts are reasons why we ought to do
those things. If we currently lack an adequate general framework for normative
explanation,  normative  theorists  should  be  interested  in  developing  a  better
framework. This is especially because it would be premature to conclude from the
shortcomings of a particular theory like Skow’s that exploring what constitutes a
correct  complete  answer  to  a  why-question  won’t  yield  valuable  insights  into
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normative  explanation.  It  allows  us  to  theorize  about  normative  explanation
without  taking  any  very  specific  stand  on  what  kind  of  entities  (grounds  or
otherwise) figure in correct answers to normative why-questions. Intriguingly, the
fact  that  why-questions  request  different  things  in  different  contexts  (causes,
grounds,  and  other  things  as  well)  makes  room for  the  possibility  that  correct
answers  to  why-questions  in  normative  contexts  might  have  some  distinctive
features, in addition to unifying similarities with correct answers to why-questions
in other contexts.
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